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Late in 1938, the Army Air Corps decided it needed a bombing range in
Hawaii and, after reviewing "all possible areas" in the Territory of Hawaii,
they decided that a location on the Ka'u coast of the Hawaii National Park
was the "only suitable site." The park site, they insisted, met all their needs.1
The park site, however, had been set aside by Act of Congress to preserve
its natural features unimpaired for public use. Utilization of the park area for
this intended military use would necessitate its withdrawal from public use
as the two uses were not compatible. Military use, furthermore, was in conflict
with the Act of 1916 which established the park. Such Army use, and the
necessary withdrawal of land from the park, would establish a precedent
difficult to control and dangerous to the whole park system.2
Hawaii National Park Superintendent Edward Wingate, meeting with the
military in November 1938, indicated he would not object to an application
from the Army for use of the area for a specified time, with no permanent
structures, and after every effort had been made to locate a suitable range
outside the park.3 The Army, however, had already selected the site they
wanted. They applied for use of nine square miles of Ka'u seacoast the
following April.
In response to a wire from Regional Director Arthur E. Demaray,4 Wingate
reported his November 1938 meeting with the military, and indicated the
Army had not looked for other areas, such as the uninhabited desert site at
Manuka which was available. Furthermore, during their meeting with him in
1938, they had talked of seven square miles, not the nine they were now
requesting. He recommended that no more than six miles be made available
and that this be done after the Army had explained what other sites they had
investigated, and why those were unavailable. He also urged that any with-
drawal of park lands not be effected until the Territory had taken the necessary
steps toward transferring the Kalapana extension lands to the park.5
The Army persisted and on May 29, 1939 the Secretary of the Interior
wrote the Secretary of War that "if you say" this is the only suitable site,
Interior would make no administrative objections.6 This use of the area,
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however, per provisions of the Act of 1916, would require that it be
"eliminated" from Hawaii National Park by Congressional action. The War
Department felt it had the necessary legislative support and a bill was intro-
duced by Texas Senator Morris Sheppard in spring 1940 for the larger area
of 9 square miles, nearly 6450 acres, plus a number of park roads and trails,
and the scenic Hilina Pali cliffs, to be known as the Na Puu O Na Elemakule
Range.7
The bill set off a flurry of protests from conservation minded groups and
individuals whose complaints were much the same as Wingate's: the area had
been set aside in perpetuity and this withdrawal set a dangerous precedent.
Typical were the comments of Richard W. Westwood, managing editor of
Nature magazine: In view of the present European situation, he wrote,
Congress will pass "anything that seems to have military significance . . .
without consideration of the consequences. With all the terrific destruction
going on in the world today, the still small voice of conservation is going to
have a more and more difficult time making itself heard."8
The bill was eventually amended to the smaller area of 3052 acres, and
General Charles D. Herron, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, agreed to the inclusion of the same terms as found in other similar
agreements: that with non-use or abandonment the area would revert to its
previous owner. The withdrawal was effected on July 16, 1940.
On December 4, 1940 Wingate notified the Director of the National Park
Service of the additional sites the Army proposed to use on Mauna Loa and
Haleakala, both within Hawaii National Park, and in September 1941,
forwarded a new series of complaints from conservation minded citizens
protesting a bombing range in the park, especially as recent rumor had it the
Army had since acquired lands for an additional range near South Point.9
The Army Air Corps had its necessary bombing range in mid-1940; World
War II began in December 1941, nearly 18 months later.10 Yet, except for a
brief period in 1943 when the Navy did some practice bombing, the military
did not use this 3052 acres they had arranged to withdraw from a National
Park. The Army did not use it at all. In fact, little is heard of the bombing
range until March 25, 1945 when a plane strafed the area around Apua Point
and slightly injured two fishermen.11 Protests to the Army brought disclaimers
that they had anything to do with it, that it must have been Navy planes.
A Col. Muller also sent a brisk memo to Navy officials to the effect that they
were to "eliminate this hazard."12 In December 1945, the Army formally
relinquished a separate area of two acres at Apua Point, but did not mention
the Elemakule bombing range.13
The following spring, Acting Superintendent Paul Baldwin wrote to ask if
it wasn't about time to reopen the Ka'u question. Before retiring, Super-
intendent Wingate had indicated he felt there was no need for congressional
action, as Congress had left the precise area of the withdrawal to be decided
between the Interior and War Departments. Baldwin noted the area had never
been used by the Army and if they were giving it up, it should go back to the
National Park Service, not to the Navy.14 The area was a goat patrol problem
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for the park, but access for goat drives had been refused and when park
personnel were allowed in at all, they were fired upon.15 Secretary of the
Interior Julius A. Krug agreed, and on April 23, 1945 invited the Secretary
of War to join in sponsoring legislation for its return.16 War, however, wanted
"a study" of this joint legislation and the matter faded from view until April
1948, when the Army reported it could foresee no use for the area and would
not object to legislation authorizing its return to the National Park Service.
In June 1947, Service administration asked for a list of war-use-permits
scheduled to have expired six months after duration, that is, no later than
March 1946, which showed two Haleakala sites, Kilauea Military Camp, and
the Ka'u Bombing Range still in military hands.17
On September 30, 1948 the area was again used for bombing, with no prior
warning. A request to the Air Force for an explanation brought a surprised
reply from the Army Air Commanding Officer at Hickam who again disclaimed
responsibility but reported that the Navy had posted a newspaper notice of
possible use.18 General Travis followed this with a memo dated October 5,
1948 saying that there would be no more bombing there "under any circum-
stances" as there were other adequate ranges elsewhere. On the other hand,
he also promised advance notification should an "unsettled situation" require
use of the area.19
Although the Army no longer needed it, the Navy now seemed to. The local
park staff urged immediate legislation to return the lands to the National Park
Service, if necessary asking the Army Air Force to sponsor such legislation.
Such a bill was proposed for introduction to the 81st Congress but apparently
nothing came of it.20 The Army did undertake to clear unexploded projectiles
and then restore the Ka'u Desert Impact and Training Area, also within the
park. It is not known if they also cleared the bombing range.21 Finally, in
May 195022 the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Interior agreed on
revoking the order of withdrawal. This was accomplished June 14, 1950.
Although the Elemakule Bombing Range received light use, the park did
not escape unscathed. Immediately after December 7, 1941 the 27th division
under General Ralph Pennell moved into the park and took over several
buildings and other facilities. Although on their departure in October 1942
several small tools had disappeared, some expensive glassware had been
broken and a tractor-grader had been damaged (repaired eventually by the
Army Engineers), their commanding officer had cooperated fully in protecting
the park.23
Shortly after their departure, however, a "bothersome problem" arose
through use of the park by various Army units for motorized and infantry
maneuvers and firing practice without reference to the park administration.
Wingate's Report to the Director for the fiscal year 1943 is a masterpiece of
understatement in reporting this invasion. This use, he reported, was doing
extensive damage to the forests and desert terrain and was observed carefully
for some time before the matter was taken up with the new commander. The
best that could be gotten from these negotiations was the latter's approval of a
tentative agreement to confine the Army activity to a specified area on certain
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days each week, and the assurance that as rapidly as possible this use would be
lessened and if possible discontinued. Though this tentative agreement could
not be approved by the Service officially, it was reasonably adhered to locally,
although it had been necessary to call the General's attention to violations of
the agreement that he had put in the form of an order to personnel under his
command. The assignment of a range officer at nearby Kilauea Military Camp
to control Army activity helped, but the roads were still deteriorating badly,
minimum restoration cost of damaged areas was already over $50,000 and
some sections could never be restored. So long, wrote Wingate, as Martial
Law remains in effect no further alleviation can be expected, except possibly
through a change in local commanders, since the Army has authority under
this law to do whatever it deems necessary to promote the progress of the war.24
Regional Director Owen A. Tomlinsom had long since sent Wingate's
reports on to the Director, with the notation that Army use of the area was a
mere convenience, but not a necessity, and the Secretary of War could, if he
wanted, issue blanket instructions in respect to park areas.25 At the very least,
training in the park should be limited to Territorial defense needs.
The Martial Law aspect, however, made it futile to forbid Army use and
even with the tentative agreement, Wingate had an uphill fight to preserve
park values. He was in regular correspondence with General Herbert D.
Gibson, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, on many viola-
tions of the agreement in respect to: the area to be used (expanded at will
beyond the original agreement); the degree of damage (Gibson felt it was
minimal, but in April Wingate was protesting wilfull damage with restoration
costs of over $100,000 in an area set aside and dedicated "by Congress as a
public park and pleasure ground for all people");26 and unnecessary hazards
and harassment (trip wires across both patrol and public trails, with no
warning of their installation; permission to clear the road of boulders in
preparation of an eruption, which included explicit instructions that each
boulder was to be placed just off the edge of the road clear of the shoulder
"to a position directly opposite the one it now occupies.") He also asked that
the entire operation be moved to available private land.27
The protests eventually reached the Departmental level and on January
30, 1944 Interior Secretary Abe Fortas wrote the War Department that there
was no debate on the use of the Ka'u Reservation (the bombing range), but
there was a definite protest on the use of unauthorized areas in the park
referred to informally as the Ka'u Desert Impact and Training Area.28
Specifically, Interior wanted the Army to withdraw from the latter area. On
November 27, 1944 Secretary Fortas tried again, pointing out that for two
years, with no permit, the Army had been using the Ka'u area of Hawaii
National Park with resulting heavy damage.29 Martial Law had been termin-
ated in the Territory on October 24, 1944 and there was no longer any need
to train men, even for Territorial defense, in a National Park.30 He again asked
the Secretary of War to instruct the Army to withdraw from the area and
restore it to its original condition.
In January 1945 the Army finally discontinued their unauthorized use of
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the Ka'u Desert area for training purposes and maneuvers, which had involved
both heavy and light weapons, although they retained warning signs for
months after that.31
That April, Wingate was still having to explain, this time to a Major Bryan,
that "at no time was permission requested to make use of park lands for these
activities and none was ever given since this office and the Park Service is
without authority under law to grant permission for activities of this nature."32
At Army request, however, an estimate was made of the amount of work
necessary to clean up the area, obliterate scars and do such restoration work
as was still possible. Damage in many places was so grave as to be impossible
of repair; koa groves had been blasted, nene nesting sites were gone, the
intensive use of the desert had thoroughly broken the crust of the desert ash
and the aesthetic values of the area had been largely destroyed for years to
come, as well as its values for studies of plant invasion and successions.33
World War II ended in August 1945. In December 1945 the Army finally
relinquished one acre at the end of the Chain of Craters road;34 in April 1946
they restored some of the damage done outside the Ka'u area; and in the
spring of 1949, Army Engineers proposed clearing only trails and a buffer zone
around trails and auto areas and leaving the other areas "unsearched". This
was rejected as inadequate and between June and November, Kilauea and
most of the Ka'u sections were cleared of unexploded shells by a Schofield
Army Ordinance team.36 The Superintendent's Report for January 1955
noted duds were still being found in the Ka'u desert. There is no mention of
"restoration"; several areas show damage to this day.
NOTES
1
 Superintendent's Report to the Governor, June 1940.
2
 Hawaii National Park (hereafter HNP) file: 601-04. 1938, Nov. 20, Wingate memo.
3
 HNP file: 601-04. 1939 April 19.
4
 HNP file: 601. 1939 April 20.
5 HNP file: 601-04. 1939 April 19.
6 HNP file: 601-04. 1939 May 26.
7
 HNP file: 601. 1940 April 11. Wirth to HNP.
8
 HNP file: 601-04. 1939 clips.
9
 HNP file: 601. Wingate to Dir, NPS.
10
 HNP file: 601-04. 1946 Feb. 19. Baldwin to Dir, NPS.
11
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1945 May x.
12
 HNP file: 601-04. *945 July 10.
13
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1945 Dec. 28.
14
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1946 Feb. 19. Baldwin to Dir, NPS; Superintendent's Annual
Report to Director, NPS, fiscal year 1945.
15
 HNP file: 601-04.
18
 HNP file: 601 -04.1. 1945 April 23.
17
 HNP file: 601-04.1. *947 June 18.
106
18
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1948 Oct. 1.
19 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1948 Oct. 5.
20
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1948 Oct. 11.
21
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1949 Oct. 13, Nov. 2.
22
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1950 May.
23
 Superintendent's Annual Report to Director, NPS, fiscal year 1943-
24
 Ibid.
25
 HNP file: 601 -04.1. 1943 March 4.
26
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1943 July 6.
27
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1943 Aug. 4, Dec. 1.
28HNPfile:601-04.1.
29
 Ibid.
30
 Superintendent 's Annual Report to Director, N P S , fiscal year 1945.
31
 Superintendent 's Annual Report to Director, N P S , fiscal year 1945; Super intendent ' s
Report t o Governor , June 1945.
32
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1945 April 7.
33
 Superintendent's Annual Report to Director, NPS, fiscal year 1945.
34
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1945 Dec. 28.
35
 HNP file: 601-04.1. 1949 March 21, Oct. 13, Nov. 8.
107
